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ABSTRACT The integration of communication networks and the Internet of Things (IoT) in Industrial Control Systems 
(ICSs) increases their vulnerability towards cyber-attacks, causing devastating outcomes. Traditional Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs), which are mainly developed to support Information Technology (IT) systems, count vastly on predefined 
models and are trained mostly on specific cyber-attacks. Besides, most IDSs do not consider the imbalanced nature of ICS 
datasets, thereby suffering from low accuracy and high false positive on real datasets. In this paper, we propose a deep 
representation learning model to construct new balanced representations of the imbalanced dataset. The new representations 
are fed into an ensemble deep learning attack detection model specifically designed for an ICS environment. The proposed 
attack detection model leverages Deep Neural Network (DNN) and Decision Tree (DT) classifiers to detect cyber-attacks 
from the new representations.  The performance of the proposed model is evaluated based on 10-fold cross-validation on two 
real ICS datasets. The results show that the proposed method outperforms conventional classifiers, including Random Forest 
(RF), DNN, and AdaBoost, as well as recent existing models in the literature. The proposed approach is a generalized 
technique, which can be implemented in existing ICS infrastructures with minimum changes. 
INDEX TERMS cyber-attacks, critical infrastructure, industrial control system, integrity attack, operation technology, 
information technology, deep learning, neural network 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Critical infrastructures are highly complex systems that 
utilize cyber and physical components in their daily 
operations. The backbone of these facilities consists of an 
Industrial Control System..(ICS), which plays an important 
role in the monitoring and control of critical infrastructures 
such as smart power grids, oil and gas, aerospace, and 
transportation [1] [2]. Therefore, the safety and security of 
ICSs are paramount for national security.  
 
The inclusion of the Internet of Things (IoT) in ICSs 
opens up opportunities for cybercriminals to leverage the 
system vulnerabilities towards launching cyber-attacks [3] 
[4]. Awareness of the cyber-security vulnerability in ICSs 
has been growing since Stuxnet, the first cyber-attack that 
specifically targeted these technologies, revealed in 2010. 
Stuxnet intended to sabotage the system’s operation without 
disturbing Information Technology (IT) systems [5]. In 
2015, another cyberattack by the name of Black-Energy was 
used to target Ukraine's power grids, causing a massive 
power outage that affected about 230,000 people [6]. In 
February 2020, three U.S. gas pipeline firms announced 
another cyber-attack alleging a shutdown of electronic 
communication systems for multiple days [7]. While some 
of these attacks may result in information leakage, others can 
damage the physical system or misrepresent the system state 
to the monitoring engineer. These examples emphasize the 
growing cyber threat on Operational Technology (OT), 
which runs much of the enabling computer technologies that 
ICS in critical infrastructure (i.e., power, gas, and water), 
now rely on [2] [8].  
 
While the security concerns of critical infrastructure 
facilities are already considered in the IT community, limited 
efforts have been made to develop security solutions that are 
specific to ICSs and OT environments [9]. Due to the 
differences between the nature and characteristics of IT and 
OT systems, these attacks mostly remain invisible to the 
traditional IT security measures such as Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDSs) and anti-virus programs. Also, the 
communication protocols used by ICS (e.g., Modbus or 
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DNP3 [10] and IEC standards [11]) are not adequately 
secured by traditional IDS. Therefore, strong security 
mechanisms are required to be designed explicitly for OT 
environments and ICSs to defend such attacks and to protect 
critical infrastructure facilities.  
 
Different frameworks for IDSs have been used in the 
literature, such as model-based [12], and learning-based 
approaches [13] [14]. Most of these techniques utilize the 
available data to develop a model that exhibits the normal 
behavior of the system, then identify all different behaviors 
as abnormal. Since these methods are only trained on specific 
types of attacks, they are not able to detect unseen or new 
attack types [15] [16]. Besides, current IDSs are. customized 
for specific systems/protocols, which lack adequate 
generalization [18]. 
 
Most importantly, the existing literature does not 
consider the imbalanced nature of ICS datasets, which results 
in low detection rates or high false positive in real scenarios 
[17]. A dataset is imbalanced if the instances of some classes 
are far fewer than other classes. The fundamental principle 
of classification is finding the boundary between different 
classes. If some classes are rarely presented, they may not be 
able to provide enough information to determine the 
boundary. Therefore, they may be treated as outliers 
resulting in wrong classifications. 
 
Confronting these concerns, in this paper, we propose a 
generalized ensemble deep learning method for cyber-attack 
detection in ICS, which is evaluated on different real ICS 
datasets. The proposed deep learning model consists of 
multiple unsupervised Stacked Autoencoders (SAE) that learn 
new representations from imbalanced datasets. Then, new 
representations from each SAE are passed to a Deep Neural 
Network (DNN) via super vector and concatenated using a 
fusion activation vector. Finally, a Decision Tree (DT) is used, 
as a binary classifier, to detect attacks from the newly merged 
representations. Experiments show that the proposed model 
outperforms existing approaches with an acceptable 
performance even though fewer malicious instances are used. 
 
The main contributions of the proposed method can be 
listed as follows:  
• Developing a deep representation learning model to 
construct new balanced representations. The new 
representations increased attack detection accuracy and 
robustness (f-score) in an imbalanced environment. 
 
• Increasing the detection accuracy and reducing the 
false positive rate by developing an ensemble deep 
learning algorithm based on DNN and DT classifiers to 
detect cyber-attacks from the new representations. 
 
• Developing a generalized model that can be used in 
different critical infrastructure facilities with minimum 
changes in the existing system. The proposed 
framework utilizes representation learning and 
ensemble methods that can be trained to detect cyber-
attacks in ICSs regardless of the data imbalance ratio.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II 
gives a literature review of recent studies in the field of ICS 
security. Section III presents a brief overview of the general 
ICS structure, system model, and different attack models 
considered in this work. The proposed method is described 
in Section VI. Section V includes results and case studies 
followed by the concluding remarks in Section VI.  
 
     
II. Related Work 
 
Traditionally, ICSs were in an isolated environment with the 
focus on safety, where each system is safeguarded to stop the 
process if something goes wrong. However, the introduction 
of Internet protocols, IoT devices, and wireless technologies 
within ICSs has resulted in significantly less isolation from 
the outside world. Consequently, safety mechanisms, which 
were not designed to deal with malicious attacks, face more 
vulnerabilities than ever before. 
The majority of current existing techniques on cyber-
attack detection in ICSs are based on traditional IDSs, which 
are mainly designed for IT security analysis [5] [17]. IDSs 
can be categorized as signature-based and learning-based 
techniques. Signature-based approaches use databases and 
fixed signatures to detect known attacks, rendering them 
inefficient in detecting unknown or new attacks [19]. On the 
other hand, learning-based systems aim to identify process 
trends or behaviors that increase the efficiency to manage 
unexpected intrusions [20]. [21] used a common-path mining 
method for anomaly detection in smart cyber-physical grids. 
An attack detection technique based on the Pearson 
correlation between two sensor parameters was used in [22]. 
Authors in [23] utilized an IDS based on the Gaussian 
process to the attack strategy for anomaly detection. While 
these approaches are effective in detecting unusual activates, 
they are not reliable due to frequent upgrades in the network, 
resulting in different IDS topologies.   
In contrast, learning-based IDSs are designed based on a 
moving target to continually evolve and learn new 
vulnerabilities [24] [25]. These methods try to generate the 
normal behavior of the system using existing datasets, then 
identify the irregular pattern as abnormalities. The authors of 
[26] proposed an anomaly detection technique based on 
reinforcement learning and convolutional autoencoders for 
ICS. Alternatively, [27] addresses the detection of Denial of 
Service (DoS) attacks using Support Vector Machine (SVM) 
and RF. [28] suggested an unsupervised technique for the 
effective detection of privacy attacks based on 
observations of eavesdropping attacks. [29] uses a variety of 
DNN methods, including different variants of convolutional 
and recurrent networks for cyber-attack detection in water 
treatment facilities. An ICS anomaly detection method using 
Long Short-term Memory (LSTM) networks is proposed in 
[30]. The authors of [31] proposed an attack detection 
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techniques based on Hierarchical Neural Network. Similarly, 
[32] proposed a deep learning-based IDS through utilizing 
Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs). 
 
In another study [33], the authors applied a stacked 
Nonsymmetric Deep Autoencoder (NDAE) to develop their 
IDS. [34] proposed an unauthorized intrusion detection 
technique and conducted backdoor attacks on a SCADA 
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) testbed. [35] proposed a 
graphical model-based approach for detecting abnormal 
behavior in an ICS using Bayesian networks to map the 
relationship between sensors and actuators. [36] 
implemented a toolchain with multiple state-of-the-art 
Anomaly Detection (AD) techniques used for detecting 
attacks that appear as anomalies. Their findings suggest that 
detection rates can change dramatically when considering 
different detection modes, thereby necessitating a reliable 
and real-time AD technique to maintain resilience in critical 
infrastructures. [37] proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) to 
find the best NN architecture for a given dataset, using the 
NAB metric to determine the consistency and quality of 
different architectures. [38] evaluates the application of 
unsupervised machine learning algorithms, including DNN 
and SVM, to detect anomalies in the Cyber-Physical System 
(CPS) using data from a Secure Water Treatment 
(SWaT)...testbed. Results indicate that the DNN classifier 
results in less false positives when compared to the one-class 
SVM, while SVM can detect more anomalies. 
 
Although the above-mentioned works addressed some of 
the issues related to cyber-attack detection in ICSs, most of 
them are heavily reliant on feature engineering. These 
methods are quite complicated and require sophisticated 
learning techniques, which can potentially increase their 
computational burden. Furthermore, the majority…of 
current proposed…techniques are. evaluated using balanced 
datasets, which lack the standard representation of 
imbalanced data in the ICS environment. Thus, it is hard to 
deploy such algorithms as they cannot extract various 
discriminative information from real-world imbalanced 
datasets. As such, in this paper, we propose a deep learning-
based attack detection technique, which extracts a new 
representation from raw imbalanced datasets, for reliable and 
accurate attack detection with a low false-positive rate in 
highly imbalanced datasets from ICS environments.  
 
III. System Model 
A. Industrial Control Systems 
A typical ICS network in a SCADA system architecture, as 
shown in Figure 1, consists mainly of a remote station, 
primary center, and regional center. These systems can 
interact with each other via wide/local area networks or 
Radio Telemetry. The primary center gathers data from field 
sensors, identifies new setpoints to track the operations of the 
network, and detects any existing irregularities. Then, 
instructions are sent to the remote station to monitor 
telemetry from field devices [39]. The regional station 
manages the network communication and regional power 
consumption between the primary and remote stations. 
 
ICS can be modeled using non-linear and non-Gaussian 
processes through the following equations: 
 
xk = g(xk−1, ωk) 
yk = h(xk, υk) 
(1) 
(2) 
 
where the state of the system is denoted by xk ∈  ℝ
n at time 
k. Sensor measurements are denoted by yk ∈  ℝ
m. The 
process and sensor noise are denoted by ωk and υk 
respectively. 
    
B. Adversary Model 
The main attack types addressed in this study involve integrity 
attacks, such as False Data Injection (FDI) and availability 
attacks, such as DoS. In FDI attacks, an attacker executes the 
attack by injecting false data into the system shown in the 
equation below: 
 
?̃? = 𝑦 + 𝛼 𝜊 𝑦𝑎 
 
(3) 
where ?̃? denotes the observation, 𝑦 is the true sensor 
measurement, 𝜊 is the element-wise multiplication, 𝑦𝑎 is the 
measurement noise, and 𝛼 is the sensor-selection vector 
described below: 
 
𝑆𝛼 ≜ {𝛼𝜖ℝ
𝑚: 𝛼𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑟 1, ∑ 𝛼𝑖 = 𝑓}
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
 
(4) 
where the node 𝑖  is chosen as a malicious node and 𝛼𝑖  is equal 
to 1. Typically, the intruder can exploit up to 𝑓 of 𝑚 sensors 
to fully inject false data into the system. 
 
On the other hand, DoS attacks include measurement 
(packet) loss with two main types of modeling, including 
 
 
FIGURE1.  ICS Standard Operation analysis model 
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Bernoulli distribution [40] and Markov model [41]. The 
attacker usually initiates DoS attacks by manipulating sensor 
readings and jamming communication channels, thereby 
flooding packets in the network [42]. This is illustrated below: 
 
𝜇𝑘(𝑖) = {
1
0
 
 
 
(5) 
where 𝜇𝑘 ∈ ℝ is the measurement vector state matrix and 
𝜇𝑘(𝑖) denotes the element 𝑖 in the state transmission matrix. 
Consequently, measurement data received under DoS attacks 
by the state estimator can be expressed in the following matrix: 
 
 
𝓏?̀? = [
𝜇𝑘(1) × 𝓏𝑘
𝜇𝑘(2) × 𝓏𝑘−1
⋯
𝜇𝑘(𝑑 + 1) × 𝓏𝑘−𝑑
] 
 
 
(6) 
  
where 𝓏?̀? is equal to the measurement data gathered from DoS 
attacks. 
        
IV. Proposed Method 
 
To overcome some of the issues associated with existing 
approaches, in this section, we propose a generalized deep 
learning model that works with raw imbalanced datasets. The 
proposed model generates a new balanced representation from 
a raw dataset and feeds it to an ensemble deep learning model 
for classification. The deep learning model consists of 
multiple unsupervised SAE that learns new representations 
from imbalanced datasets. The SAE attack detection model 
utilizes multiple Autoencoders (AE) to extract a new 
representation from unlabeled data to obtain different patterns. 
Then, new representations from each SAE are passed to a 
DNN via super vector and concatenated using a fusion 
activation vector. Finally, a DT is used, as a binary classifier, 
to detect attacks from the newly merged representations. The 
schematic of the proposed model is presented in Figure 2.  
 
 
A. The Proposed Ensemble Deep Representation 
Learning Model 
 
Most existing approaches proposed in literature neglect the 
fact that real ICSs are highly imbalanced (the number of attack 
samples is a lot less than the number of normal samples). This 
will result in a low f-measure, which reflects the low 
performance of these models in an imbalanced environment 
like ICSs, thereby makes them impractical for real-world use 
cases.  
Once a model is directly trained with a highly imbalanced 
dataset, the new malicious data are likely to be misclassified. 
To address this problem, we propose an ensemble deep 
representation-learning model based on SAE to enhance the 
overall performance of the model. This is done through 
extracting an equal balanced set and passing it to multiple AE 
to generate new representations. The input sample 𝑥𝑖 in a 
sample set 𝑋 corresponding to the hidden layer is represented 
in the following equation: 
 
ℎ𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖) = 𝜎(𝑊1𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏1) 
 
(7) 
where W and b represent the weight matrix of neurons and bias 
vector of all neurons between the input and hidden layers, 
respectively [43]. 𝜎 is a function of the hidden layer used after 
beginning the training process by updating the next input layer 
to construct a set of stacked multi-layer AEs. Although using 
an ensemble model has increased the computational efficiency 
by a little, it was evident that utilizing multiple AE would lead 
to much better f-measure scores. 
 
To enhance the performance of each AE, a dropout layer 
is added to enhance the generalization of our model by 
reducing the reliance of the output on a specific set of 
parameters.  Also, the number of nodes and layers was 
selected through cross-validation of various networks with 
critical analysis of loss history and validation accuracy. Binary 
Cross-Entropy (BCE) is used as the cost function, represented 
by:  
 
𝐽 = −
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑦𝑖 . log(𝑝(𝑦𝑖)) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖). log (1 − 𝑝(𝑦𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
 
 
(8) 
where 𝑦1 and 𝑦2 represent attack and normal samples, 
respectively. 𝑁 is the total number of samples, and 𝑝(𝑦) is the 
expected likelihood of an attack sample. BCE was used over 
Mean Squared Error (MSE) to prevent neuron weight changes 
in the hidden layer of the AE from getting smaller and smaller, 
thereby stalling out the system.  
 
 
B. The Proposed Ensemble Deep Learning Attack 
Detection Model 
 
Once the new representations are generated form the 
imbalanced dataset, they are fed to an ensemble of DNN 
classifiers to detect normal from abnormal behaviors. The 
results from each DNN is then concatenated, via super vector 
using a fusion activation function, and passed on to a DT 
classifier to detect attacks from the newly merged 
representations. A DT classifier was selected based on 
multiple tests using different machine learning classifiers, with 
DT providing the best performance results. The fusion 
activation function of the sigmoid layer is represented by the 
following equation: 
 
𝐿1 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖 log(𝑡𝑖) . 𝑤𝑠 + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) log(1 − 𝑡𝑖) . 𝑤𝑙
𝑚
𝑖=1
 
 
 
(9) 
where 𝐿1 is the fusion activation function of the sigmoid layer, 
𝑦𝑖 is the label of 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ sample, 𝑡𝑖 is the prediction of the i-th
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sample. 𝑤𝑠 and 𝑤𝑙 are weights of unstable and stable samples, 
respectively. 𝑤𝑠  is set larger than 𝑤𝑙 to improve the detection 
of unstable samples, and 𝑤𝑙  is always set to 1 as a benchmark 
to mine unstable patterns effectively [33].  
 
The AEs were tested in a for loop, using a different number 
of layers, neurons, batch sizes, loss and activation functions, 
optimizers, epochs, and dropout layers, to achieve better 
accuracy and f-measure. Both SAE and DNN utilize BCE cost 
function as well as Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation 
function to achieve best performance measures, represented 
by: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝐿𝑈(𝑥) = max(0, 𝑥) 
 
(9) 
where 𝑥 is the observation. 
The pseudocode of the proposed attack detection 
algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. 
 
IV.  Case Studies and Results Analysis 
 
A. Data Preparation  
Ideally, using new real SCADA data should be appraised, but 
due to the limitations of available real datasets, this study 
resorted to realistic ICS datasets obtained in 2015 and 2018. 
In this section, two different ICS datasets are used to evaluate 
the performance of the proposed algorism’s efficiency against 
random ICS models. 
• Gas Pipeline (GP): This dataset is obtained from a gas 
pipeline system and contains a Modbus validation frame 
of a preprocessed dataset in an Attribute-Relation File 
Format (ARFF) to help researchers use specialized 
preprocessing techniques. It also has a deep packet 
inspection of the Modbus frame with each line 
representing one network transaction. The dataset 
contains 17 features, with a total of 274628 observations 
split into 219702 (80%) samples for training and 54925 
(20%) for testing [44].  
 
• Secure Water Treatment (SWaT):  This dataset 
includes 11 days of continuous operation, in which 7 
days were recorded under normal operation conditions 
and 4 days with attack scenarios. SWaT contains a total 
of 51 features, collected from network traffic ports, 
sensors, and actuators, with a total of 1048576 
observations split into 838860 (80%) samples for 
training and 209715 (20%) for testing [45].  
 
 
B. Evaluation Metrics 
When it comes to the security of ICSs, the concern revolves 
around detecting cyber-attacks while achieving high f1-scores 
on imbalanced datasets, thereby minimizing the rate of false 
alarms. As with standard machine learning benchmarking 
metrics, this work considers True Positives (TP), False 
Positives (FP), True Negatives (TN), and False Negatives 
(FN), defined in Table I, as the performance evaluation 
metrics for the attack detection models. 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Overview Model of Stacked Autoencoder Algorithm 
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The performance of the machine learning algorithms is 
measured by the following metrics [44]:  
 
• Accuracy: Ratio of samples classified correctly over the 
entire dataset. 
𝐴𝑐𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
 
(10) 
• Precision: The percentage of correctly classified 
positive samples. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃
 
 
(11) 
• Recall: The ratio of correctly predicted positive samples 
over the total samples of the corresponding class. 
𝑅𝑒𝑐 =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
 
 
(12) 
• F1 Score: Harmonic mean of precision and recall. 
𝐹1 =
2 × 𝑇𝑃
2 × 𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
 
 
(13) 
The F1-score aims to find an equal balance between 
precision and recall, which is highly important in 
performance evaluation for imbalanced datasets (i.e., the 
number of attack samples are a lot less than the number of 
normal samples). 
 
 
C. Performance Analysis 
   
General Performance Analysis- In this section, two different 
ICS datasets gathered from a gas pipeline system and a water 
treatment facility were used to evaluate the performance of the 
proposed method. Results were compared with DNN, RF, DT, 
and Adaboost based classifiers along with multiple peer 
approaches in the current literature. Tables II and III provide a 
summary of performance evaluation metrics results, including 
accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score. As illustrated, the 
results of the proposed method, in both datasets, outperform 
existing techniques in all four metrics, and most importantly 
on f-measure, which highlight the efficiency of the proposed 
model in imbalanced ICS environments. 
 
Imbalanced Testing- To evaluate the efficiency of the 
proposed method under different imbalanced conditions, we 
have tested the model with different imbalanced ratios.  
Imbalanced ratio of 0.1 means 10% of the attack samples were 
used, and in the same way, an imbalanced ratio of 1 means a 
%100 is utilized.  
 
 
Algorithm 1: The proposed ensemble attack detection SAE model 
Data: Input all datasets including Normal and Attack samples  
Training Phase: 
for 10 folds of cross-validation do 
Split the dataset into Training (80%) and Testing (20%) sets 
Normalized the data: 𝑧 =
𝑥−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑥)) 
max(𝑥)−min (𝑥)
 
Separate the samples into four balanced sets with each containing (50 % 
Normal, 50% Attack) samples. 
Training the SAE model  
Feed each balanced set to the SAE model to generate new representations 
of data 
for number of epochs do 
for number of batches in the balanced set 1 do 
Train the autoencoder: min ℒ (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) 
Loss function: Binary Cross Entropy (BCE),  
Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of batches in the balanced set 2 do 
Train the autoencoder: min ℒ (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of batches in the balanced set 3 do 
Train the autoencoder: min ℒ (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of batches in the balanced set 4 do 
Train the autoencoder: min ℒ (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑖) 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
The new representations sets are then used to train four DNN models 
for anomaly detection 
Training the ensemble DNN detection model: 
Train 4 DNN models, each corresponding to the 4 new 
representation sets 
for number of estimators do 
Train the DNN model on set 1 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of estimators do 
Train the DNN model on set 2 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of estimators do 
Train the DNN model on set 3 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
for number of estimators do 
Train the DNN model on set 4 
Loss function: BCE, Optimizer: Adam 
end 
end 
end 
Fusion Layer: 
Merge the new representations from each DNN to form a Super-vector 
using the NumPy concatenating function 
Pass the super vector to a final DT binary detection model 
Training the DT model: 
for number of estimators do 
Train DT classifier on new merged representation 
end  
Testing Phase: 
Normalize the test sample 
Pass 4 test sets through the SAEs 
Pass each new generated representation from SAE to DNN for anomaly 
detection 
Fuse the output of the DNN into a super vector 
Pass the super-vector to a DT model for binary classification 
Output: Normal/Attack label 
 
TABLE I 
UNITS FOR MAGNETIC PROPERTIES 
 
 Attacked Secure 
Classified as Attacked TP FP 
Classified as Secure FN TN 
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As shown in Figures 3-6, results of the proposed method 
exceed other techniques with a flat curve in all metrics for 
the GP dataset. This verifies the robustness of the proposed 
method as its performance is not affected by different 
imbalanced ratios. Although other methods have an 
acceptable accuracy, the recall and precision are 
significantly lower than that of the proposed method. 
However, our proposed method maintains consistent results 
in all four metrics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 3 Accuracy under different imbalance ratios for the Gas Pipeline 
dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 4 Precision under different imbalance ratio for Gas Pipeline 
dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 5 Recall under different imbalance ratios for the Gas Pipeline 
dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 6 F1-score under different imbalance ratios for the Gas Pipeline 
dataset. 
 
For further analysis, the proposed model was evaluated 
on the SWaT dataset, too. Since the model is generalized for 
different ICS environment, the proposed model was tested 
without any modification on the model structure or 
parameters. As illustrated in Figure 7-10, the proposed 
method outperforms existing techniques in all four metrics. 
Better performance compared to the first case study could be 
attributed to the fact that there are more samples for training 
in the SWaT dataset than what exists in the GP dataset. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE III 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON ON 
THE SWAT DATASETS 
 
Method Acc Pre Rec F1 
Proposed 99.67 0.97 0.99 0.99 
SVM [37] - 0.93 0.699 0.79 
RNN [37] - 0.94 0.699 0.8 
ID CNN [29] - 0.96 0.799 0.87 
TABOR [35] 94.99 0.86 0.79 0.82 
AE [38] - 0.89 0.80 0.84 
AE Frequency [38] - 0.92 0.83 0.87 
DNN 96.24 0.96 0.95 0.95 
     
 
 
TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE COMPARISON ON 
 THE GAS PIPELINE DATASETS 
 
Method Acc Pre Rec F1 
Proposed ⁕ 0.96 0.9463 0.9372 0.9383 
CAE [26] 0.86 0.8806 0.8612 0.8358 
SVM [27] 0.92 0.7820 0.9360 0.8520 
LSTM [30] 0.92 0.9400 0.7800 0.8500 
NB [36] 0.90 0.8195 0.7692 0.8595 
DT 0.86 0.9159 0.6808 0.7239 
DNN 0.84 0.8994 0.6389 0.6709 
RF 0.83 0.9142 0.6298 0.6591 
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FIGURE. 7 Accuracy under different imbalance ratios for the SWaT 
dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 8 Precision under different imbalanced ratios for the SWaT 
dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 9 Recall under different imbalanced ratios for the SWaT dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE. 10 F1-score under different imbalance ratios for the SWaT 
dataset. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Critical infrastructures are complex cyber and physical 
systems that structure the lifeline of modern society, and 
their reliable and secure operations are essential to national 
security. In this paper, we proposed a generalized ensemble 
deep learning-based cyber-attack detection method 
specifically designed for ICS.  The proposed technique 
includes a deep representation-learning model, which 
constructs new balanced representations from the raw 
imbalanced dataset. The new representations are then used in 
an ensemble deep learning algorithm based on DNN and DT 
classifiers to detect cyber-attacks. The performance of the 
proposed model is verified using two different ICS datasets 
obtained from real critical infrastructure facilities. Our 
proposed approach outperformed conventional classifiers 
with %10 higher f1-score in both datasets evaluated and 
produced higher accuracy, with %95.86 for the Gas Pipeline 
dataset and %99.67 for the Secure Water Treatment dataset. 
Results were compared with traditional classifiers, such as 
RF, DNN, and ADA, along with multiple peer proposed 
approaches in the current literature. The proposed approach 
outperformed other techniques in all four-evaluation metrics. 
Although our approach performed better than existing 
techniques, there is room for improvement when dealing 
with few samples, as illustrated in the GP dataset. 
Additionally, identifying the attack type and its location is 
also very important to prevent processing downtime and 
computation efficiency once an attack is detected. Therefore, 
our future work will focus on optimizing the accuracy of the 
proposed method and developing an additional model to 
identify different attack types and their locations. This will 
avoid critical system failure and improve the network 
security of ICSs against similar cyber-attacks. 
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